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· Mulii-Party Litigation-Venue Statutes 
and Their Application 
An injured seaman sued his employer in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover 
damages for injuries suffered on board his employer's vessel. The 
court granted the employer's motion to implead the United States 
as a third party defendant. The employer claimed indemnity for 
any damages the seaman recovered for injuries aggravated by 
_treatment in a United States hospital. The seaman then moved 
to amend his complaint to allege an action directly against the 
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The United 
States objected that venue in the Southern District was improper 
under the act which provided that "Any civil action on a tort 
claim against the United States ... may be prosecuted only in the 
judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or 
omission complained of occurred."1 The seaman resided in New 
Jersey, and the alleged aggravation occurred in a hospital in the 
Eastern District of New York. Held: Motion to amend granted. 
The proposed amendment was not a "civil action" within the 
meaning of the language quoted above.2 
The court was faced with another case3 presenting a conflict 
between the clear language of a venue statute and the desirable 
policy of settling all claims arising out of one transaction in a 
single lawsuit, thus preventing inconsistent results as well as 
saving time. In resolvihg that conflict in favor of consolidating 
all law .suits arisi;ng out Qf a single transaction in. one dist:dct; the 
14 Where ra truck is operated with permission such liability 1s probably 
valid. See Moore v. Palmer, 350 Mich. 363, 86 N.W.2d 585 (1957), 
where the lessor wa:s driving h!s lea:sed truck as an employee of the 
lessee. Noted in 11 VAND. L. REV. 911 (1958). 
1 28 u.s.c. § 1402(b) (1948). 
2 Ibid. 
s Abramovitch v. United.States Lines, 174 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. N.Y. 1959). 
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court refused to follow a prior decision by another judge in the 
same district,4 and applied a strained and unusual interpretation 
to the phrase "civil action." It is difficult to see why an ordinary 
tort action by a seaman against the United States for damages 
based upon the claim that hospital treatment aggravated injuries 
previously sustained is not a "civil action." 
When an original defendant impleads a third party defendant 
a majority of courts hold that the third party action may proceed 
in the federal court without any allegation, or proof, that inde-
pendent federal jurisdictional grounds exist.5 Also most have dis-
pensed with the requirement that the third party action satisfy 
the venue statutes.6 The latter result has often been rested upon 
the doubtful logic that since no independent federal jurisdictional 
grounds must exist, the venue requirements are also not applic-
able.7 Without questioning the logic of the proposition that a 
third party action is ancillary for venue purpose if it is ancillary 
for jurisdiction, the proposition does not support the result in this 
case. Federal courts have generally held that the original plaintiff 
who seeks to amend his complaint to state a cause of action against 
the third party defendant, after he has been impleaded, must 
allege and prove independent federal jurisdictional grounds.8 Thus 
in the present case it is impossible to argue that independent venue 
is not necessary because the suit is ancillary for jurisdiction. 
Existing authorities are about evenly divided over whether 
venue requirements must be met by a plaintiff who seeks to state 
a cause of action against the third party defendant. The issue 
has been decided differently by the district courts where it has 
been presented.9 The first edition of a leading treatise suggests 
that venue requirements must be met,10 whereas the second edi-
tion flatly states no objection to venue should be allowed.11 An-
4 Habina v. M.A. Henry Co., 8 F.R.D. 52 (S.D. N.Y. 1948). 
11 The cases are collected in 37 A.L.R.2d 1411, 1420 (1954). 
6 Moncrief v. Pennsylvania R.R., 73 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Mor-
rell v. United States Air Lines Transp. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1939); United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709,714 (10th Cir. 1954), 
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954). 
7 Ibid. 
s The cases are collected in 37 A.L.R.2d 1411, 1430 (1954). 
9 In contrast with the case under discussion, see Habina v. M. A. Henry 
Co., supra note 3. · · 
10 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14: 02, at 748 (1st ed. 1938). 
11 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 1428.3, at 506 (2d ed. 1953). 
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other authority,12 without citing any support, argues that since 
the plaintiff must show independent jurisdictional grounds to slie 
the third party defendant, the venue requirements apply also. 
Probably Congress passed the venue provision of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act unaware of the issue presented by this case. 
Therefore, it seems permissable to base a decision upon the gen-
eral purposes of venue provisions. Venue requirements are· de-
signed to select a forum which will not oppress the defendant, and 
which will not be unfair to the plaintiff. In the instant case the 
plaintiff chose the forum originally and does not object. The third 
party defendant is before the court upon the complaint of the 
third party plaintiff, and since the plaintiff's suit against the third 
party defendant must arise ". . . out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against 
the third party plaintiff,"13 allowance of the plaintiff's amended 
complaint cannot work a hardship upon the third party defendant. 
He is in court to litigate the impleaded action which will require 
proving the same facts which will be relevant in the suit against 
him by the original plaintiff. 
It is true that if the plaintiff need not show proper venue for 
his suit against the third party defendant, the plaintiff is permitted 
to sue a person in a district which would have been improper 
venue for a lawsuit against that person without the impleader. 
If there is evidence to show that the plaintiff and the original 
defendant have colluded and used the impleader action to make 
possible the plaintiff's suit against the third party defendant which 
but for the impleader would have been dismissed for improper 
venue, then this should be grounds for requiring the plaintiff to 
meet venue requirements. In the absence of evidence of collusion 
between the plaintiff and the third party plaintiff, the result of 
the instant case seems justified.14 
12 71 HARV. L. REV. 877, 916 (1958). 
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 14. 
Charles Kimball, '62 
14 Exhaustive text material covering this area of the law may be found 
in 71 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1958), especially £rom pages 910 to 913; 
139 A.L.R. 919 (1942); 37 A.L.R.2d 1411 (1954). 
